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Using insights from ‘embodied cognition’ and a resulting ‘cognitive theory of the firm’, I aim to 
contribute to the further development of evolutionary theory of organizations, in the specification 
of organizations as ‘interactors’ that carry organizational competencies as ‘replicators’, within 
industries as ‘populations’. Especially, I analyze how, if at all,  ‘dynamic capabilities’ can be 
fitted into evolutionary theory. I propose that the prime purpose of an organization is to serve as a 
cognitive ‘focusing device’. Here, cognition has a wide meaning, including perception, 
interpretation, sense making, and value judgements. I analyse how this yields organizations as 
cohesive wholes, and differences within and between industries. I propose the following sources 
of variation: replication in communication, novel combinations of existing knowledge, and a path 
of discovery by which exploitation leads to exploration. These yield a proposal for dynamic 
capabilities. I discuss in what sense, and to what extent these sources of variation are ‘blind’, as 
postulated in evolutionary theory.  
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Introduction  
Outside biology, a generalized evolutionary framework, with its basic principles of variety 
generation, selection and replication, has been applied to a wide range of socio-economic 
phenomena, such as organizations (Aldrich 1999, Baum and Singh 1994, McKelvey 1982), 
industries (Hannan and Freeman 1977, 1984, 1989), economies (Hodgson 1993, 2002b, Hodgson 
and Knudsen 2005, Metcalfe 1998, Nelson and Winter 1982, Veblen 1919, Witt 1993, 2004), 
knowledge (Campbell 1974), neural structures (Edelman 1987) and culture (Boyd and Richerson 
1985, Hull 1988).  
The evolutionary perspective has a number of attractions. It accounts for development of 
forms under limited foresight. In economics and management it keeps us from the error of an 
unrealistically rational, magical view of development as the achievement of somehow prescient, 
or even clairvoyant, managers, entrepreneurs and scientists, as well as from the opposite error of 
institutional or technological determinism (McKelvey 1982). It helps to deal with what in 
sociology is called the problem of agency and structure. It forces us to recognize both the role of 
actors, with their individual preferences and endowments, in the processes of variety generation 
and transmission, and the enabling and constraining conditions for action, in structures of markets 
and institutions, in the process of selection. While characteristics of entrepreneurs and 
organizations have a causal effect on survival and growth of firms, causality can also go to other 
way, with characteristics being the result of processes of selection and retention (Aldrich 1999: 
336). It forces us to recognize causes of change both within organizations (‘autogenic’) and 
outside them (‘allogenic’)  (McKelvey 1982). It makes allowance for the radical uncertainty of   2
innovation (Shackle 1961), and for evident and ubiquitous error and failure in human endeavor. It 
forces us to accept diversity as an essential element of development. Competition in markets and 
the constraining and enabling effects of institutions are straightforwardly seen as yielding a 
process of differential survival and retention of products and practices of firms. There is 
plausibility in seeing entrepreneurship and invention as sources of variety generation, and 
personnel turnover, training, personnel transfer, imitation, consultancy and growth as the 
replication of proven success. 
Anyone who has studied socio-economic evolution recognizes that in many respects it differs 
radically from biological evolution. While earlier literature was often based on analogies from 
biological evolution, in more recent literature (Hodgson 2002b, Hodgson and Knudsen 2004, 
2005) a radical abstraction has been made, in the definition of ‘universal Darwinism’ (Dawkins 
1983) in terms of only the overall, ‘meta-theoretical framework’ (Hodgson and Knudsen 2005: 
16) of variety generation, selection and replication, regardless of the very different ways in 
which they operate in different areas of application. Hodgson and Knudsen claim that this overall 
framework applies universally to biological as well as economic, cultural, and cognitive systems. 
It is needed to explain why some organizations last longer or grow more than others, and why 
some are imitated more than others (Hodgson and Knudsen 2005: 6). While universal Darwinism 
gives a useful conceptual orientation of research, it leaves most of the explanatory work still has 
to be done, in a specification of the processes of variety generation, selection and replication, in 
terms of people, work, management, innovation, organizations, industries, markets and 
institutions. It is my aim to contribute to that.   
I adopt two further notions from evolutionary theory. The first is the distinction between 
replicators and interactors (Campbell 1974, McKelvey 1982, Hull 1988) or vehicles (Dawkins 
1982) and the second is the notion of populations. Interactors/vehicles (in biology: organisms) 
interact with their selection environment, and are members of populations of similar but 
differentiated interactors (in biology: species). To function as an interactor, an entity must have a 
reasonably cohesive and stable set of components. This is the ecological side of evolution (Baum 
and Singh 1994). Interactors carry replicators (in biology: genes) that generate, in interaction 
within the interactor as well as with its environment (in biology: gene expression in ontogenetic 
development), characteristics of interactors that affect their survival and replication. Note that it is 
not the replicators themselves that determine survival but the characteristics that they produce. 
Replicators from surviving interactors are replicated and re-combined, mostly within populations 
of interactors that partake of a common pool of replicators. This is the genealogical side of 
evolution. Organizations, in particular, are seen as interactors, in their environments of markets 
and institutions, as members of industries seen as populations, and their competencies (McKelvey 
1982) are seen as the corresponding replicators, with industries sharing a common pool of such 
competencies.  
The contribution of this paper lies in the analysis of the three least researched aspects of the 
evolution of organizations (Baum and Singh 1994): the identity of interactors, the nature and 
characteristics of replication, and the process of variety generation. The structure of the paper is 
as follows. First I give a discussion of key issues in evolution in socio-economics, in order to 
specify the questions addressed in this paper. Second I give a sketch of the theory of cognition 
used in this paper, and the cognitive view of organizations to which it leads. This yields a view on 
the nature of their replicators, their identity as interactors, and on intra- and inter-population 
differences between them. Third I give an analysis of the sources of variation. The paper ends 
with a summary of conclusions. 
In the literature on organizations, the present paper falls squarely in what Aldrich (1999) 
called the ‘knowledge development’ stream of organization theory. In this paper, use of insights 
from cognitive science is inspired by the fact that in socio-economics both replication and variety 
generation are fundamentally cognitive and linguistic processes.  
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1. Issues in Evolutionary Theory of Organizations 
This paragraph discusses key issues in evolutionary theory of organizations, in order to specify 
the questions to be answered in this paper. The first issue concerns the nature of replicators 
relevant for organizations and the identity of organizations as interactors. The second issue 
concerns the influence that interactors may have on selection conditions. The third issue concerns 
replication of competencies by means of imitation and communication, and its relation with the 
generation of variety. The fourth issue concerns the extent to which, and in what sense, variety 
generation is ‘blind’ and how it may be guided by experience in selection.  
 
Interactors, Replicators and Organizations 
The literature on evolutionary theory of organizations allows for connected evolutionary 
processes on multiple levels: of skills, jobs; of workgroups or communities of practice (Brown 
and Duguid 1996), within organizations (Burgelman 1983); of organizations within industries; 
and of industries in wider socio-economic systems (Baum and Singh 1994). However, it is not 
always clear what, precisely, the interactors and replicators are, on different levels. Here I focus 
on organizations as interactors in industries as populations. The following questions arise. 
For groups of people, such as organizations, to operate as interactors, there must be group 
selection. For that to work, individual interests must somehow be subjugated to collective 
interest. Organizational identity, cohesiveness and stability may be prevented by the dominance 
of centrifugal individual or group interests within the firm (Campbell 1994). So, what provides 
organizational cohesion and stability? 
If organizations are interactors, what are the corresponding replicators? McKelvey (1982) 
proposed that organizations are characterized by ‘dominant competencies’. Nelson and Winter 
(1982) used the term ‘routines’, but there is some ambiguity and confusion around that term, and 
I prefer McKelvey’s terminology. What, precisely, are these organization-level competencies?   
For industries to make sense as populations of organizations, there must be both differences 
and similarities between firms within an industry, and possibilities for replication that are greater 
within than between industries. Due to imitation and personnel mobility between organizations in 
an industry, or even between industries, organizational identities may not be sufficiently 
differentiated and isolated for selection to work (Boyd and Richerson 1985). How do we account 
for intra- and inter-industry differentiation? 
Finally, in this section, a question is to what extent interactors can affect or shape the 
replicators they carry, on the basis of experience with evolutionary selection. To the extent that 
they can, evolution is, at least in part, Lamarckian, with ‘inheritance of acquired characteristics’. 
It is commonly agreed that in socio-economics this does widely apply. However, as argued, 
among others, by Hodgson and Knudsen (2005), if direct shaping of replicators by their carriers 
were complete and fast, so that replicators reflect any shift or variety of the selection 
environment, evolution would break down. Survival would no longer be an indicator of success, 
and many unproven, worthless or deleterious traits would be imitated along with favorable ones. 
In other words, as recognized by most authors, for evolution to work there must be some isolation 
of replicators from influence by interactors, or, in other words, some inertia of interactors. For 
organizations this entails that they cannot instantly and completely adjust all their competencies 
to perceived exigencies of the environment (Hannan and Freeman 1984). While this is plausible, 
analysis is needed to show why this is so, and to what extent organizations may still escape from 
inertia, and that also is a subject for this paper.  
In sum, the questions in this section are: what constitutes the replicators of organizations, in 
the form of organization-level competencies, how do these yield a cohesive and stable 
organizational identity, how does this yields differences as well as similarities within industries, 
more opportunities for replication within than between industries, and some but limited shaping 
of competencies as a function of experience in environments of markets and institutions. I will   4
investigate this on the basis of a ‘cognitive theory of organization’ (Nooteboom 1992, 2000) that 
is based, in turn, on a branch of cognitive science that is becoming to be known as ‘embodied 
cognition’ (Damasio 1995, 2003, Edelman 1987, 1992, Lakoff and Johnson 1999).  
 
Efficiency of Selection 
A second issue in evolutionary theory of organizations is that singly or collectively they can to a 
greater or lesser extent affect or mold the selection environment of markets and institutions to 
favor their survival and reproduction, in ‘co-evolution’ or ‘niche-construction’ (Aldrich, 1999). 
While this is not unique for selection in socio-economics, and also occurs to a considerable extent 
in biology, in economic systems the scope for it seems an order of magnitude larger, on the basis 
of some intelligent inference of causalities of selection, the ability, power and political influence 
to set standards of technology and legitimation, to shape market structure (e.g. distribution 
channels), to erect entry barriers, and to develop economies of experience.  
A well-known example of the setting of selection conditions concerns the rivalry between 
competing technologies, and correspondingly different standards of acceptance, for hearing aids 
in the form of cochlear implants (Garud and Rappa 1996). Here, let me give another illustration. 
In the innovation of a cotton carpet (instead of wool), it was first introduced for bedrooms, in 
view of the moisture regulating properties of cotton and its nice feel to bare feet. However, cotton 
fiber does not have the natural resilience of wool, so that in use the pile of a cotton carpet rapidly 
flattens, but after vacuuming regains its fresh look. Now, resistance of carpets to such pile 
flattening was a key feature in certification of quality, thus favoring wool over cotton, and the 
new carpet could effectively enter the market only after the large innovator managed to have the 
certification procedure modified to accept vacuuming prior to inspection. Such actions to mold 
the selection environment are also amply illustrated by Aldrich (1999: 334).  
However, while for these reasons selection may be limited or inefficient, not even the most 
visionary entrepreneur, nor the most powerful of corporations, can completely mold their 
environment to guarantee success, survival and dominance, and some selective pressure will 
remain. The limits are not only limits of power, but also cognitive limits. One may make mistakes 
in inferring what structure of selection favors differential survival and growth, for lack of insight 
in causalities of selection and opportunities that any change might yield to unforeseeable new 
innovations that constitute a threat to incumbent organizations. Returning to the example of the 
cotton carpet, the most salient thing is perhaps that it took trouble to alter the selection conditions, 
even in only one though crucial respect, which might have failed, in which case the innovation 
would likely not have survived. While there is much more to be said about this issue, it is not a 
subject for the present paper, since although selection seems very imperfect it still seems 
sufficient to let this issue pass.  
 
Replication 
A third issue concerns processes of replication, and the relation between replication and variety 
generation. In socio-economic evolution, replication entails reproduction and imitation of 
knowledge and competencies, on different levels. This occurs on the basis of observation, 
communication and apprenticeship. Successful products and practices are copied or imitated on 
the basis of observation and inference, reverse engineering, publications and documents, oral 
presentations, courses, reports and explanations by consultants, and the like. Apprenticeship may 
merit special notice. Knowledge is externalized not only in speech, documents, software and 
ostensive activity, or role models, but is also embodied in tools, in a general sense including 
machines, procedures and forms of organization. In learning to use tools, an apprentice may 
reconstruct some of the mental schema’s that lay behind the design and production of the tool.  
In socio-economics, these forms of replication entail linguistic processes of expression, sense 
and reference, and cognitive processes of assimilation into mental schemata (Aldrich 1999, Piaget 
1970, 1974) or mental models (Johnson-Laird 1983) that constitute absorptive capacity (Cohen   5
and Levinthal 1990). Fundamentally different from replication of genes in biology, replication of 
knowledge and competencies is: 
-  At least partly voluntary and subject to choice: one adopts what is perceived to be 
successful 
-  Partial: one may, within restrictions of systemic coherence, adopt only part of a bundle of 
replicators associated with a given interactor 
-  Subject to decay, distortion, reduction, extension and transformation (going far beyond 
the copying errors, deletions and duplications of genes in biology). In other words, 
replication at the same time entails a degree of variety generation. 
This issue will be analyzed with the use of insights from the embodied cognition branch of 
cognitive science.  
 
Variation 
A fourth issue, in evolutionary theory, and this is the third subject for the present paper, concerns 
the sources of variation, and, in particular, how blind, or random, and how independent from 
selection, variety generation is.  
According to most evolutionary accounts, the main trigger of radical innovation is a shock in 
the form of a break or shift of the selection environment, which may increase competition for 
scarce resources, disadvantage incumbent species, and create new opportunities for new variety. 
Such a shift or shock may be due to natural disaster, political upheaval and war, a shift in 
demand, a shift in institutions (e.g. regulations for protecting the environment), or a shift due to 
developments in related industries or markets. However, this tells us only of new opportunities, of 
how radical innovation is enabled or challenged, not of how it is generated. 
In evolutionary theory, generation of new variety, in new interpretations or new ideas is 
generally ascribed to errors in replication, mistakes, random, uninformed trials as steps into the 
dark (‘mutations’). In socio-economic evolution there is no doubt much trial and error in 
entrepreneurial venturing, and more so to the extent that the innovation is radical, i.e. entails 
destruction of existing competencies (Anderson and Tushman 1990, Tushman and Anderson 
1986), technologies, and forms of organization, without the opportunity to build on existing 
knowledge and competence. However, evidently in socio-economic evolution there is invention 
and knowledge development that is informed, somehow, by experience from failures and 
resulting inferences about where sources of failure may lie and where to look for improvements. 
This is too obvious to ignore or deny, and Aldrich  (1999), Foster and Metcalfe (2001) and 
Nelson and Winter (1982), to name only a few, all recognize that next to blindness there is also 
intentional, deliberate, and somehow directed variety generation.  
Thus, according to Foster and Metcalfe (2001: 10) 
 
‘The rate of economic progress that we observe reflects guided variation within conceptual 
schemes that channel explorative, creative enquiry in particular directions’. However, they 
immediately add: ‘Of course, all variation is, in effect, blind variation, since it necessarily 
deals with the unknowable consequences of a present decision.  
 
What does it mean that variation is both guided and blind? Little, if anything, in the 
evolutionary literature, is said how the ‘guidance’ or ‘direction’ of variation works in 
‘explorative, creative enquiry’. More generally, the generation of variety is the least developed 
side of evolution in socio-economic systems (Baum and Singh 1994: 18).  
According to Hodgson and Knudsen (2005: 11) evolution is blind in two senses. First,  
 
… particular outcomes are not necessarily prefigured or predicted in advance. 
   6
I agree with that. However, this leaves open the possibility of an intelligent design of a path 
of discovery, guided by experience from selection, that is likely to yield radical novelty, even 
though it cannot be predicted what that will be. That is precisely what I will argue.  
According to Campbell (1987),  
 
.. any capacity for foresight or prescience must be based on tried and tested knowledge, 
otherwise we have no grounds to presume its effectiveness. Accordingly, when genuine 
innovations are launched, we are unable to assess the probability of their success or failure 
(Hodgson and Knudsen 2005: 11).  
 
I agree with the first part (experience is needed to presume effectiveness) but I disagree with 
the second part. Because we can make inferences from experience we can ‘presume 
effectiveness’, i.e. increase likelihood of success beyond blind trials, even if perhaps that cannot 
be rendered in terms of probability theory (cf. Shackle 1962).  
Campbell (1974) specified blindness as entailing variations that are (1) independent of each 
other, (2) separate from the environment, (3) uncorrelated with the solution, and (4) later 
variations are not corrections of former ones. Applying these criteria, I will argue that there is 
non-blind variation.  
The often-heard claim that a theory of invention would be self-defeating or even self-
contradictory, because by definition invention cannot be predicted, is based on confusion between 
prediction and explanation. One can claim to have some understanding of processes of invention 
without thereby claiming to be able to predict its outcomes. That applies to evolutionary theory 
more broadly: it explains principles of process without claiming to predict its outcomes.  
In the evolutionary literature, some authors have allowed for variations that are guided from 
higher level, variety generating ‘search’ routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Other literature also 
suggests that there are higher level ‘dynamic capabilities’ that direct the change of lower level 
capabilities (Teece et al. 1997). Dynamic capabilities include rational inference of cause-effect 
relations, rules for experimentation, and ability to utilize organizational memory. They also 
include exchange of codified knowledge with others, in what (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995) called 
‘knowledge combination’ and Zollo and Winter (2002) later called ‘deliberate’ as opposed to 
‘experiential’ learning. So, the question now is to what extent, and how, organizations can 
develop dynamic capabilities (Teece et al. 1997) to escape from inertia (Lewin and Volberda 
1999, Zollo and Winter 2002). In what sense, and to what extent is this blind? How is it related to 
selection, and to what extent can it anticipate success in selection? 
   
2. A Cognitive Theory of Organization 
This paragraph summarizes the ‘embedded cognition’ view used, and the cognitive theory of 
organization to which it leads.   
 
Embodied Cognition 
I adopt a view of knowledge and learning that is much used in the organization literature, and is 
known as the ‘activity theory’ of knowledge (Blackler 1995), according to which mental models 
or categories or schema’s of knowledge are developed from experience in interaction with the 
(physical and social) world (Kolb 1984, Levitt and March 1988). Though not often recognized, 
this goes back to the developmental psychology of Piaget (1970, 1974) and Vygotsky (1962), 
according to which ‘intelligence is internalized action’. For example, in child development 
groping and prodding develop into pointing, which forms the basis for reference that is the basis 
for language. Playing with blocks provides a basis for learning to count, add and subtract. 
Experience in dealing with physical objects yields metaphors by which we construct abstract 
concepts (Lakoff and Johnson 1980).   7
In sociology this view is related to symbolic interactionism (Mead 1934, 1982). In 
philosophy, it is closely related to American pragmatism (since Peirce 1957) and the ‘organicism’ 
of Whitehead (1929), according to which any element in the system is an outcome of relations 
with other entities, and in which individuals both constitute and are constituted by society 
(Hodgson 1993: 11).  
This organic, interactionist view is crucial, since it provides a perspective from which we 
may transcend the otherwise seemingly irreconcilable gap between economics, with its 
methodological individualism, and sociology with, in some branches, its tendency towards 
methodological collectivism. The individual is social in that one derives one’s individuality in 
interaction with others, but what one makes of the interaction is not the same as what others make 
of it. Individuality is a function of inherited endowments of mental constructive potential and 
interactions along individual courses of life that yield the experience for construction. Hence 
there is ‘cognitive distance’ between people to the extent that they have developed along different 
paths, in different environments. This distance is both a problem, for mutual understanding and 
collaboration, and an opportunity, to learn something new from people who have constructed 
their cognition differently (Nooteboom 1992, 1999).   
While the perspective of cognition adopted here is connected with interpretive views of 
knowledge and meaning (Berger and Luckmann 1967, Weick 1979, 1995), it is less subjectivist 
than some of them. I maintain that even though we cannot claim to know the world objectively, 
since we cannot ‘descend from our mind’ to test the claim, it is reasonable to assume that an 
external reality does exist, somehow, and that if indeed our mental structures are constructed in 
interaction with it those structures in some sense represent that reality, in what Lakoff and 
Johnson (1999) called ‘embodied realism’.  
In cognition, a mental ‘neural Darwinism’ seems to obtain, in which neural structures 
emerge, in selection, reinforcement and reproduction, according to their performative success 
(Edelman 1987, 1992). The activity based view of cognitive construction is consistent with this.   
Cognition is thus ‘embodied’ as well as embedded in the outside world, and its embodiment 
denies any Cartesian dualism of body and mind (Damasio 1995). There is a continuum of bodily, 
endocrinal, involuntary neural, emotional, and rational levels of activity that interact (Damasio 
2003).  
Note that in this perspective cognition is a fundamentally social notion, in its construction 
from interaction. It is also a broad notion, including value judgments, feelings and emotions As a 
result, cognitive distance has many dimensions. It has a more substantive side of cognition in a 
narrower sense of job-related knowledge and skills, and a more intentional, normative, moral side 
of goals, values, interests and ways of resolving conflicts. One of the attractions of embodied 
cognition is that it provides continuity with social psychology, with its insights into decision 
heuristics that mingle emotions and rationality (Bazerman 1988).  
Note that this constructivist, interactionist view of cognition implies that mental schema’s and 
corresponding competencies are formed from interaction with the external selection environment. 
In that sense, the selection environment not only selects interactors in which ideas are 
implemented in action, but also contributes to the Lamarckian formation of replicators in the 
course of action.  
 
Organizational Identity 
Hodgson and Knudsen (2004) usefully argued that the cohesiveness of the interactor, needed for 
evolution to work, requires at least a core of components that stand or fall together with each 
other and with the interactor as a whole. More precisely, the probability of survival of one 
component is connected with the survival of other components in that core. The question now is 
how organizations achieve the cohesion and stability required for interactors.  
Here, the notion of cognitive distance, developed previously, leads to a cognitive theory of the 
firm (Nooteboom 1992, 1999, 2000). One problem for achieving collective goals lies in the   8
cognitive distance between its members. If it is too large, it is very cumbersome to coordinate 
competence and governance. More precisely, it would be cumbersome, and inefficient, to achieve 
mutual understanding on perceptions of the environment, goals and priorities of the firm, relevant 
technologies, products, markets, actions in jobs and roles, and technical coordination between 
them, in ‘dominant competencies’ (McKelvey 1982), on the competence side, and categories and 
instruments for alignment of interests, and conflict resolution, on the governance side. To 
function as a coordinated system of actions, organizations need some more or less specialized 
shared language or jargon, perceptions, understanding and morality, as part of organizational 
culture (Schein 1985). Without such focus of shared perceptions, meanings, understandings and 
values, too much effort, time and aggravation would have to be spent on disambiguating 
meanings, eliminating misunderstanding, setting priorities, establishing directions, coordinating 
activities, and negotiating the terms of collaboration. This cognitive focus constitutes the 
advantage of organization over market, in contrast with, but not entirely separate from, the logic 
of transaction cost economics (Nooteboom 1999). This is the view of organization as a system for 
‘sense-making’ (Weick 1995), ‘collective mind’ (Weick and Roberts 1993), system of ‘shared 
meanings’ (Smircich 1983).  
The intentional, moral, institutional side of organizational focus, concerning values and 
norms of behavior and conflict resolution is needed, among other reasons, because imperfect 
monitoring and measurement of performance hinder alignment of purpose and conflict resolution 
by means of incentives. Moral guidance partly replaces, and complements, purely extrinsic 
motives by more intrinsic ones that require less monitoring. The importance of this has increased 
since work has become more professional and based on higher levels of knowledge work that are 
more difficult to monitor and measure.  
The main point here, for the present paper, is that organizational cognitive focus, produced 
and reproduced by organizational culture, forms the core of organization-level competence, to 
achieve coordinated bundles of competencies that constitute the replicators of organizations. 
Organizational focus constitutes a cohesive whole of perceptions, meanings and values that 
define roles, relations and procedures of interaction, and thereby yield the requisite cohesion and 
stability of organizations as interactors. While the raison d’être of organization as a focusing 
device is that it enables cognitive and moral coordination, for the sake of efficient goal 
achievement, and is therefore positively selected for in market competition, it also helps to create 
the stable and differentiated organizational identities needed for evolutionary selection of 
organizations to work.  
In addition to the distinction between the competence and governance side of focus, there are 
three dimensions for both: width, i.e. the range of different areas of knowledge, competence and 
governance, depth, i.e. the variety of concepts and rules in each area, and flexibility, i.e. 
allowance for improvised, unforeseen meanings, standards, division of labor, roles, skills, 
procedures, and the like. The distinction between width and depth is similar to such distinction in 
product differentiation and portfolio’s of products in general. There, width refers to the different 
kinds of products, and depth to the variety of qualities and brands in each. Here, the contrast 
between firms and markets appears: firms yield maximum scope, variety and flexibility, in both 
competence and governance. That would be impossible to coordinate, in central planning, and 
when tried would yield stagnation: the fixing of ideas, meanings, standards, division of labor to 
maintain exploitation would disastrously limit the scope for exploration.  
Organizational focus cannot be integrally and instantly re-shaped as a function of experience 
in selection, and this limits Lamarckian adaptation, and yields some organizational inertia. The 
limits to such change lie in the systemic cohesion of elements of cognitive focus and in the fact 
that cognitive focus serves as an absorptive capacity that tends to mostly confirm itself in its 
functioning (imprinting). However, and this will be discussed later, there is a process by which 
absorptive capacity does transform itself in its functioning, so that there is some Lamarckian 
mechanism, and an escape from inertia, but in a series of conditioned steps that require time. It is   9
an empirical question to what extent the speed of that is sufficient to escape from selective 
pressures.  
Organizational focus emerges from the imprint from the entrepreneur who started the 
organization, is subject to some drift due to turnover of staff, and to shifts due to crises, caused, in 
particular, by shifts in the environment, or by new, challenging interpretations of the 
environment, and by the weeding out by selection, in population effects. When resources are 
scarce and competition is tight, selection is likely, in the long run, to yield organizational 
cognitions and structures that reflect the exigencies of the environment of markets and 
institutions. Consider, for example, the view that stable environments tend to favour 
‘mechanistic’ environments while turbulent environments tend to favour ‘organic’ ones (Burns 
and Stalker 1961), or more specialist vs. more generalist organizations (Hannan and Freeman 
1977).  
Organizational focus will be narrowest, and cognitive distance smallest, in single-person, 
owner-manager firms, wider in work groups, wider yet in larger firms consisting of multiple 
groups, and widest in multi-divisional firms. In larger firms, especially distance in job-related 
competence is larger, in a wider and deeper division of labor, but distance on the moral side of 
cognition is not necessarily larger. In fact, since in face-to-face work groups there is more 
informal, spontaneous social control of free-ridership (Simmel, 1950), there the need for more 
explicit moral focus is less. In larger organizations more attention may be needed to the moral 
dimension of organizational focus across different work communities. A difference in culture 
between large and small firms lies in the fact that with a more extensive division of labor, with 
coordination between greater numbers of people across possibly distant organizational units, 
knowledge and rules need to be codified to a greater extent than in small firms, where 
coordination can take place by direct supervision (Mintzberg, 1983). 
 
Organizational Boundaries 
This cognitive perspective of organization also gives a new slant on organizational boundaries 
and on inter-firm alliances. Aldrich’s (1999) definition of organization as goal-directed, 
coordinated activity systems (which I adopt) includes the maintenance of more or less clear, 
stable boundaries (which I reject). While clear and stable boundaries may apply to most 
traditional organizations, it is much less the case for modern web-based, ‘virtual’ enterprises and 
network forms of organization. Apparently, the assumption of clear and stable boundaries is 
deemed necessary to yield the organizational cohesion needed to make evolutionary selection 
work. But why would entrepreneurs or managers want that selection to work? If with fuzzy 
and/or variable boundaries and imitation and buy-out of personnel from other firms they can 
escape selective forces, why shouldn’t they? The following conundrum then arises. If 
organizations are selected, in evolution, for their ability not to have clear and stable boundaries, 
while those are necessary for selection to work, how can this be?  
My view is that the notion of cognitive focus is sufficient for a stable and cohesive identity of 
organizations and does not require clear and stable boundaries of activity.  
Organizational focus creates organizational myopia, and in addition to all the other motives 
for inter-firm alliances, familiar from the extensive alliance literature, this gives an additional, 
cognitive reason, to prevent myopia by means of complementary outside cognition from alliance 
partners (Nooteboom 1992, 1999). Here, cognitive distance applies to organizations, as 
differences in shared language, meanings, perceptions, understandings and values and norms of 
behaviour. In empirical work, measures of the cognitive distance between firms have been 
constructed on the basis of indicators from organizational data and technological profiles derived 
from patent data (Wuyts et al. 2005).  
Note here the condition, familiar from the alliance literature, that when organizations 
outsource activities they must often still retain absorptive capacity with respect to those activities, 
to properly collaborate and coordinate with outside sources (Granstrand, Patel and Pavitt 1997).   10
In other words, some of the related competence remains part of organizational focus. Note also 
that while organizations may not have clear boundaries of activities, in sharing activities with 
other organizations, and may have shifting boundaries, in outsourcing and integrating activities, 
firms do and should have a clear legal identity, as pointed out by Hodgson (2002a). Unclear 
boundaries of legal ownership and liability would create institutional havoc 
 
3. Differences in Organization 
This paragraph analyses the implications of cognitive theory of organization for differences 
between organizations within and between industries.  
  
Intra- and Inter-Population Differentiation 
Cognitive distance also applies to the higher aggregation level of organizations, in differences in 
organizational focus, i.e. differences in shared language, meanings, perceptions, understandings 
and values and norms of behaviour (Schein 1985). In empirical work, measures of the cognitive 
distance between firms have been constructed on the basis of indicators from organizational data 
and technological profiles derived from patent data (Wuyts et al. 2005, Nooteboom et al. 2005).  
Within industries, cognitive distance, thus difference in organizational focus, is limited, 
particularly concerning the competence side of technologies and competencies, due to shared 
technologies, market demand, market structures, technical and professional standards, etc., 
yielding what may be seen as a common pool of competencies (McKelvey 1982). As a result, 
staff exchange between organizations is feasible and can create and confirm the identity of an 
industry (McKelvey 1982: 197), yielding ‘industry recipes’ (Spender 1989). This is also enhanced 
by pressures towards conformity from needs of social, political or financial legitimation 
(Dimaggio and Powell 1983).   
However, even within industries organizational focus is more varied, and organizational 
cognitive distance is correspondingly greater, on the governance side of the moral, intentional, 
institutional order, in different styles or cultures of management. Deep differences in fundamental 
perceptions, views and (largely tacit) assumptions concerning man, his knowledge (e.g. objective 
or constructed), his relation with his environment (passive or active), his morality (basically good 
or bad), and relations with other people (egotistic or altruistic) (Schein 1985), yield differences in 
risk perception and acceptance, pro-activeness (‘locus of control’), formality or informality, 
rivalry or cooperation, intrinsic or extrinsic motivation, instruments and styles of governance and 
conflict resolution. From an evolutionary perspective, the persistence of such differences, in spite 
of selection pressures, suggests that on the moral, intentional side there are different ways to be 
successful, within an industry.   
As indicated earlier, a central issue is how to make the combination of exploitation and 
exploration (March 1991). While earlier some industries were relatively stable, allowing for a 
focus on exploitation, and others were in a state of flux, yielding a focus on exploration, now the 
combination of the two is needed in most if not all industries. Combination of the two is 
particularly difficult when exploitation is highly systemic, as defined earlier. Then, by definition, 
units within the system hardly have any room for the experimentation and deviation needed for 
exploration, since they would jeopardize systemic integrity. In that situation, exploration needs to 
be relegated to a different time or place. The classic case is the division between departments for 
production and for R&D. This yields the classic problem of divergent mentalities and priorities 
between them, with resulting misunderstandings, conflicts and recriminations. It is difficult to 
find an organizational focus that accommodates both. One method is to engage in cross-
functional teams, and another is frequent staff rotation, with an organizational focus to support 
that. Another would be to create more flexibility by decomposing the exploitation system into 
more autonomous parts, as long known from systems theory. Such choices may be made 
differently by different firms even within an industry.    11
Cultural differentiation between organizations is maintained, in spite of turnover and 
exchange of staff, because in the entry into an organization there is self-selection according to 
expected fit to organizational culture, as well as adaptation by socialization into organizational 
culture. Furthermore, according to the idea of intelligence as internalized action the further 
development of cognition reflects the environment, in this case the organization, in which it takes 
place. This confirms the problem of limited opportunity and speed of integrating new staff, 
identified by Penrose. 
Between firms in different industries there are greater differences also on the competence side 
of cognitive focus. There are, for example, deep differences in professional skill. As McKelvey 
(1982: 202) phrased it ‘.. Would you fly on an airplane that had recently been staffed with non-
airline employees? Would you enter a coal mine operated by hotel employees? Would you eat in 
a restaurant staffed by truckers?’ However, even between industries isolation is far from 
complete, and replication across industries does take place. McKelvey (1982: 206) suggested that 
to the extent that organizations are simpler characteristics are more easily exchanged, also 
between industries.  
For an illustration, consider the emergence of self-service. It emerged in retailing, largely 
outside large firms, initiated by independents but swiftly adopted by large chain store firms after 
it proved a success. Self-service retailing constitutes a distinct ‘species’ from service retailing, 
with a different structural logic, in that a fundamental reversal of roles occurred between shop 
attendant and customer. In service, the attendant moves about to collect items for a shopping 
basket, while the customer remains stationary at a counter, and in self-service these roles are 
switched, with the customer picking out its own goods, and a stationary attendant at a check-out, 
in a different lay-out of the shop. This eliminated an obstacle to shop size. In a large shop, with 
many products, under service the attendant would have to move about too far, with an 
unacceptable increase of waiting time for the customer. The emergence of self-service, with its 
attendant opportunity for larger shop size, was favored by a shift of the selection environment 
towards knowledgeable customers who no longer needed advice from shop attendants, an 
increased demand for less frequent, ‘one-stop’ bulk shopping, due to greater scarcity of time, 
enabled by transport capacity from car ownership and by refrigerated home storage capacity. In 
its turn, self-service affected selection conditions, in co-evolution, in that it enabled economies of 
scale that pushed out small shops. With its demand for pre-packaged goods, it also had wide 
repercussions for the selection conditions in packaging and food industries. In replication, 
however, isolation was very limited. The principle of self-service was quickly and widely adopted 
in other industries, such as restaurants.  
It is doubtful whether organizational focus could survive a merger or acquisition, and this 
contributes to their frequent failure. In view of greater difference in focus between than within 
industries, mergers and acquisitions are more likely to succeed within industries than between 
industries (Nooteboom 1999), and this is confirmed empirically (Bleeke and Ernst 1991). 
 
Absorptive Capacity and Isolation 
The notion of a population requires ‘isolating mechanisms’ between them. Baum and Singh 
(1994: 12) listed a number of such isolating mechanisms: technological interdependencies 
(restricting the replication of single, isolated elements from bundles), institutional pressures of 
isomorphism (Dimaggio and Powell 1983), complexity of learning (difficulty of absorption), 
resistance to learning, imprinting, and ‘network closure’. This section further develops the more 
cognitive aspects of complexity and difficulty of learning and imprinting.   
Interactively constructed mental categories constitute our absorptive capacity (Henderson and 
Clark 1990): we assimilate input from our senses into those categories (Piaget) and in so doing 
make sense of them, interpret them, and make inferences on the basis of them. Thus it is better to 
speak of the ‘reproduction’ rather than the ‘sharing’ or ‘copying’ of knowledge. At greater 
cognitive distance assimilation is more difficult, replication is less complete and faithful, and   12
more knowledge and interpretation will be ‘added’. In other words, at larger cognitive distance 
replication entails more variety generation.   
Knowledge, in the form of mental schema’s or frames corresponding with competencies is 
often largely tacit and stored in ‘procedural memory’, as ‘know-how’, and can only imperfectly 
be codified into declarative knowledge of facts, logic and causal relations, as ‘know-that’ and 
‘know-why’ (Cohen and Bacdayan 1996). Knowledge ‘sharing’, with minimal change of 
knowledge in communication, requires a certain commonality of absorption, or limited cognitive 
distance, as between practitioners of the same jobs (Miner 1991). Mutual understanding is quick, 
with few words needed, in jargon. Communication will be less faithful and fast but next best 
inside work groups (Gersick 1988) or communities of practice (Brown and Duguid 1996).  
Recall that mental schema’s and cognitive distance include not only cognition in the narrow 
sense of intellect, but also more emotion-laden moral categories of how to deal with relational 
risks from mutual dependence and rivalry. Different ways of dealing with such risks are legal or 
hierarchical coercion, balance of mutual dependence, reputation, and less self-interested motives 
of ethical conduct, empathy, identification and routinized conduct (Nooteboom 1999). However, 
note also that mutual understanding does not by itself entail lack of rivalry. Indeed, rivalry may 
increase with similarity, if similarity entails competition, and between professionals in the same 
field, or at the same organization, rivalry may be greater than between professionals in different 
fields or organizations.  
While cognitive distance yields some ‘reproductive isolation’, with limited replication, 
maintaining distinctive identities of organizations and industries, it is far from perfect, for two 
reasons. First, on the level of communities of practice, outsiders, from different communities, can 
enter and become members, after some time needed for initiation and socialization, in legitimate 
peripheral participation (Lave and Wenger 1991). Second, even at large cognitive distance one 
may still be able to selectively assimilate single but crucial elements of externalized knowledge, 
even from distinct industries. The case of self-service, emerging in retailing but copied by 
restaurants, discussed earlier, gives an illustration. 
 
4. Sources of variation 
This paragraph analyses sources of variation, i.e. the generation of new knowledge and 
competencies, or, in other words, dynamic capabilities (Teece et al. 1997). The question is how 
invention takes place, and how blind or directed it is. Three sources are indicated: transformation 
of meaning in communication, novel combinations of existing knowledge, in learning by 
interaction, and experience-based learning on a path of exploitation that leads up to exploration. 
While the first of these is blind and accidental, the second can be deliberate and designed 
(Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995, Zollo and Winter 2002), and the third is directed by selection and 
can also to some extent be designed (Nooteboom 2000).  
 
Variation by communication and collaboration 
As indicated earlier, absorption or assimilation is to a greater or lesser extent accompanied by 
expansion and transformation of the knowledge absorbed. In that sense, communication not only 
yields ‘replication’, but also contributes to the generation of variety. In communication, in 
expression by the ‘sender’ tacit knowledge can never be fully codified and externalized, so that 
expressed knowledge is always incomplete, and in absorption, or assimilation, knowledge is 
complemented and supplemented from the existing cognitive framework of the ‘recipient’. 
Furthermore, what is ‘left out’ by the sender and what is ‘added’ by the receiver, and how this is 
done, depends on clues from the context. Thus, meaning is always context dependent.  
A relevant concept here is that of ‘scaffolding’ (Hendriks-Jansen 1996, Shanon 1990). The 
context of practice and learning, including the people involved, disambiguates meaning (a 
universal becomes specific by its place in a sentence, in a context of action), triggers relevant   13
associations and cuts irrelevant ones, from a ‘seamless web of belief’ (Quine and Ullian 1970). 
Classic examples are mothers that stimulate appropriate responses from infants (Hendriks-Jansen 
1996) and teachers who draw out pupils beyond their current level of performance (cf. Vygotsky 
1962: ‘zone of proximal development’). Another example is the role of tools in apprenticeship, 
indicated before, in the construction of corresponding mental schema’s.  
This source of variation is indeed, as expected from an evolutionary perspective, blind, 
accidental, and not deliberate, planned or designed. Using the four criteria of blindness suggested 
by Campbell (1974), indicated earlier, it is blind in all but one aspect: they do not seem to be 
independent from each other, but to cohere in a ‘seamless web’ of cognition.  
March (1991) suggested that the generation of new ideas, in exploration, follows from 
personnel turnover, where people from outside an organization carry fresh ideas into the 
organization that may disturb the efficiency of exploitation but contribute to exploration. That is 
certainly part of the process of variation, but it is also limited due to the isolating mechanisms 
indicated before, especially between industries, self-selection of entrants to fit organizational 
focus, and socialization into that focus.  
More generally, new knowledge and competence can be generated deliberately and by design 
by seeking novel combinations of existing knowledge, in collaboration between different people 
and organizations. Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) recognized this as innovation by ‘combination’, 
and Zollo and Winter called it ‘deliberate learning’, in contrast with experiential learning. While 
Nonaka and Takeuchi as well as Zollo and Winter claimed that such learning by combination 
requires articulation and codification of the knowledge involved, I disagree. While codification 
certainly has its advantages, it is neither necessary nor fully possible. As argued earlier, 
knowledge can never be fully articulated and codified, and a greater or lesser degree of tacitness 
necessarily remains. Novel combinations of tacit knowledge can also arise, in close collaboration 
in teams. 
As indicated before, in learning by interaction one runs into both the problem and the 
opportunity from cognitive distance: greater distance makes mutual understanding and acceptance 
(absorptive capacity) more difficult, but also generates novelty value. If the first decreases, say 
linearly, with cognitive distance, the second increases with it, and performance of learning by 
interaction is the mathematical product of absorption and novelty value, an inverse U-shaped 
relationship results, with an optimal cognitive distance, large enough to yield novelty value but 
not so large as to preclude understanding and collaboration (Nooteboom 1999). This optimum is 
not fixed. In particular, absorptive capacity depends on the accumulation of knowledge and 
competence from past R&D (Cohen and Levinthal 1990), production, marketing, organization, 
and, in particular, experience in collaborating with others at sufficient cognitive distance. In other 
words, experience in dealing with others who think differently yields competitive advantage. An 
increase of absorptive capacity yields an increase of optimal cognitive distance. The hypothesis of 
optimal cognitive distance, and its dependence on cumulative R&D, was empirically confirmed 
by Nooteboom et al. (2005), in an econometric study of the productivity of learning by interaction 
in terms of patents from 994 alliances between 116 firms in several industries in the period 1986-
1996. 
Inter-organizational collaboration requires cognitive coordination and governance of 
relational risks. A detailed discussion of the latter goes beyond the scope of the present paper. For 
governance, there is a toolbox of instruments such as: contracting plus requisite monitoring, in so 
far as feasible in view of uncertainties of environment and behaviour, a balance of mutual 
dependence, posting of hostages, typically in the form of competitively sensitive information, 
reputation mechanisms and trust building by cultural alignment of values, personal empathy and 
identification, and routinization of conduct (Nooteboom 1999, 2002). 
In conclusion, one type of dynamic capability is the ability to find partners, at optimal 
distance, and to effectively understand and collaborate with them, in the governance of ‘relational 
risk’. This dynamic capability in the form of alliance capability can be developed by building   14
absorptive capacity and experience in communicating and collaborating with partners who think 
differently.  
How blind is variation by collaboration? Collaboration requires communication, and as 
indicated this is always imperfect, and can yield unintended and unnoticed variation. That is one 
reason why collaboration is blind in the sense that it is subject to more or less random disturbance 
and fluctuation of interpretation and meaning. It is also blind in the sense that one cannot predict 
the precise outcome of learning by interaction, since it is not based on experience, unless 
collaboration is embedded in some experiential process, to be discussed later. However, it is not 
blind in that it is informed by selective success: one selects partners in learning who have 
demonstrated to be competent in some respect. It is designed: one may have a fair guess of 
cognitive distance and select partners at optimal distance. Applying Campbell’s (1974) criteria of 
blindness, variations from planned collaboration are not independent, are not separate from the 
environment, and later variations can be corrections of former ones. They are not, however, 
correlated with the solution, in the strong sense that the outcome can be predicted.  
 
A Heuristic of Invention 
According to Piaget, in individual cognition assimilation, or absorption, not only shifts the 
knowledge absorbed, but can in the process of assimilation shift the mental schema’s employed in 
assimilation. That entails seeing new things or seeing and interpreting things in new ways. This, I 
propose, yields a source of invention in experiential learning. Nooteboom (2000) proposed that 
this is related to the issue of ‘exploitation and exploration’ (Holland 1975, March 1991), and 
proposed that it yields a path by which exploitation (assimilation) can lead on to exploration 
(invention).  
According to Piaget (1970, 1974, see also Flavell 1967) the process of assimilation 
contributes to the change of mental structure (called ‘accommodation’) in the following steps, 
with an increasing deviation from previous knowledge structures. First, in repetition schema’s are 
confirmed and stabilized in repeated application. In generalization existing schema’s are applied 
to novel contexts. In differentiation ‘proximate’ changes are made, in ‘local search’, in an attempt 
to satisfy the requirements of the novel context. Next, in reciprocation new elements are adopted 
from previously unrelated cognitive schemata, in a process of hybridization, called reciprocation, 
which then leads on to accommodation in the form of entirely novel mental architectures of 
elements from old and previously unrelated schema’s. Nooteboom (2000) proposed that this may 
yield a general ‘logic of discovery’, applicable also to organizational learning, as source of 
variation that is guided by selection. 
On some level, depending on how competence destroying an innovation is, and in how many 
dimensions it innovates, the entrepreneur has to escape from the grip of the existing selection 
environment, within a job, profession, organization, industry, country or wider economic system.  
The first reason for such exit or escape is to gain the opportunity of being different, without 
thereby succumbing to the grip of selection (Baum and Singh 1994: 13). However, there are other 
reasons (Nooteboom 2000) to exit to a different environment. 
A second reason is to gain the motive to change a dominant design, a third reason is to gain 
new insight into where the limitations of existing dominant designs lie, and a fourth is to gain 
novel experience and insight into elements of novelty, in experimentation with hybrids (Holland 
1975, Hannan and Freeman 1989, Powell 1991) that leads on to insight into what more wide-
reaching, architectural change is needed, and how it might be tackled, to allow for the full 
realization of an emerging innovation’s potential.  
It is only when existing dominant designs are subjected to new challenges, threatening 
survival, that one is willing to make the sacrifices of modifying or replacing proven and efficient 
assets for exploitation. The idea that failure to achieve objectives is an important motivational 
condition for change is an old one (Cyert and March 1963, March and Simon 1958). What is new   15
here is that one need not passively wait for a new environment to arise as a new challenge but can 
actively and intelligently choose an environment that yields interesting new challenges.  
Next to motivation for change, it is only under such novel demands that one gets new 
evidence of where limitations of validity and hence priorities for change lie. At first, one will seek 
differentiation of dominant designs, staying close to them, in proximate or ‘problemistic search’ 
(Cyert and March 1963), to maintain exploitation as much as possible. Here, one may tap from 
earlier experience, going back in organizational memory to what was tried but failed in earlier 
exploration, at the time that current dominant designs had not yet emerged.  
Next, when that does not meet challenges of survival, looking further afield by comparing 
one’s own failures with apparent successes in newly encountered practices of others in the novel 
environment one can obtain hints as to how inadequate performance may be repaired by adopting 
elements from such local practice. And, finally, it is by experimentation with hybridization, 
incorporating foreign elements into one’s own practice, that one has an opportunity of 
experimenting with novelty before surrendering the basic architecture or logic of the dominant 
design, and one is willing to make more drastic, architectural or fundamental change, because 
now one has a clue how to do it, in eliminating barriers to the full realization of the proven 
potential of novel elements or principles, currently constrained by the dominant design. It is in 
this last stage, of experimenting with novel architectures or basic principles of new configurations 
of old elements from the old dominant design and new elements from dominant designs found in 
the new environment, that radical innovation emerges. 
Note that this process yields a path of exploitation that leads on to exploration, where one 
sticks as tenaciously as possible to the dominant design while yet being prepared to deviate from 
it, in increasingly drastic departures, in a process of discovery based on shifting practice.   
  In this account, the shift of environment is undertaken voluntarily and by design. It may also 
be imposed unexpectedly from the outside, when an invading competence destroying innovation 
forces one to adapt. That is the environmental shock recognized in standard evolutionary theory.  
An empirical illustration of the proposed path towards exploration is the practice that 
emerges, in the past mostly unintended, from multinational companies (MNC’s) transferring 
products to new markets, where they run up against novel demands and constraints that require 
adaptation, and give new insights from previously unfamiliar local practice for doing things 
differently, from local competitors, suppliers and customers. While in the past MNC’s stumbled 
on such invention or discovery from other motives for expanding into foreign markets, such as 
maintenance of growth, or escape from intense price competition in saturated home markets, they 
now discover its potential for discovery, and use it as a deliberate policy for that purpose (Bartlett 
and Goshal 1989, Nooteboom 2000). In culture studies also, it is a familiar principle that novel 
culture tends to arise at, and penetrate from, the periphery of existing culture (Lotman 1990). 
This heuristic of invention shows how Lamarckianism may work, in a stepwise process, 
yielding the possibility of an escape from inertia, with an organization changing its cognitive 
identity by learning from novel environments. It also shows how speciation may work, in the 
development of novel industries on the basis of inventions, by organizations breaking up and 
yielding new configurations of cognition and competencies, in new forms of organization.     
In conclusion, a second type of dynamic capability is the ability to transfer activity to novel 
contexts that yield opportunities to maintain exploitation while yielding novel challenges and 
opportunities for a step by step process of exploration. This includes the ability to choose novel 
contexts of exploitation that are sufficiently different to yield novel challenges and insights for 
elements and directions of change and sufficiently similar to allow for some continuation, at least 
initially, of familiar competencies. It also includes the capability to tap from memory concerning 
earlier experience with exploration, to engage in differentiation. It also includes the ability to 
select local partners, in the novel context, to engage in experimentation with hybrids, in 
reciprocation. This corresponds with the capability, discussed previously, of selecting partners at   16
optimal cognitive distance, and the ability to build mutual understanding and governance of 
relational risk.  
How blind is this source of variation? It is blind in the sense that the innovative outcome of 
the process cannot be predicted. However, it is not blind in that novel selection environments can 
be selected purposely, as likely to generate opportunities to continue exploitation while yielding 
novel challenges and indications of elements and directions for exploration. The process is 
informed by success and failure in selection. Applying Campbell’s (1974) criteria of blindness, 
variations from the process are not independent, are not separate from the environment, and later 
variations can be corrections of former ones. They are correlated with the solution, in the sense 
that experience with failure and indications of solutions inform the process. However, the 
outcome still cannot be predicted.  
 
5. Conclusions 
When evolution is completely abstracted from biological evolution, in ‘Universal Darwinism’, 
with only the bare notions of variety generation, selection and replication, without specification 
of how those processes work, on the whole it can be made to fit socio-economic evolution to 
large extent. The attempt to maintain an evolutionary perspective is useful for developing a 
coherent combination of internal and external causes of change, and of agency and structure, 
avoiding both an overly rational view of managerial design and a view of environmental 
determinism without actors. However, with such a bare, abstracted framework, most of the 
explanatory work still has to be done. With this paper I aimed to make a contribution, building on 
the organizational literature, focusing on issues that have been most neglected or incompletely 
developed in previous literature. I specified four issues, concerning:  
-  The nature of the replicators carried by organizations interpreted as interactors, the 
sources of cohesion and stability of organizations as interactors, and the causes and extent 
of their differences within and between industries interpreted as populations 
-  The extent to which the selection environment of markets and institutions can be molded 
by organizations. 
-  The nature of replication, and its relation to variety generation 
-  How blind variety generation is, and the extent to which it may be guided by design and 
by learning from selection   
In an attempt to deal with these issue, I offered an analysis on the basis of a ‘cognitive theory 
of organization’, which is in turn based on an ‘embodied cognition’ branch of cognitive science 
that yields, among other things, the notion of ‘cognitive distance’ between people to the extent 
that they have developed their cognition along different life paths.  
Concerning the first issue, this yields the notion of an organization as a ‘focusing device’, to 
limit cognitive distance for the sake of efficient achievement of collective organizational goals. It 
consists of a culturally generated and maintained bundle of replicators in the form of basic 
perceptions, interpretations, meanings and value judgements concerning goals, priorities, 
technology, jobs and roles, on the competence side, and norms and values of conduct and conflict 
resolution, on the governance side. These yield requisite cohesion and stability of organizations 
as interactors, intra-industry differences mostly on the governance side, inter-industry differences 
on both the competence and the governance side, and limited possibilities for integral and 
instantaneous revision of replicators (organizational cognitive focus) by the interactor 
(organization), and thus implying a certain amount of inertia. The analysis also allows us to drop 
clear and stable boundaries of activities as part of the definition of organizations.  
Concerning the second issue, without detailed analysis I concluded that while indeed markets 
and institutions can to a greater or lesser extent be molded by organizations, singly or 
collectively, and in that sense evolutionary selection can be inefficient, significant selection 
pressures generally remain.   17
Concerning the third issue, I gave an analysis of replication on the basis of communication, 
and of how next to very imperfect replication this also yields variety generation. However, while 
in communication there is much decay, reduction, expansion and transformation of knowledge 
and competencies some similarity in transmission remains. 
Concerning the fourth issue, I argued for the intelligent design of innovation by collaboration, 
and of a path of cumulative insight and experience, guided by selection in a variety of chosen 
selection environments, that is conducive to outcomes that are unpredictable but have some 
enhanced chance of success. 
Overall, the evolutionary processes are more strongly interrelated than in biology, with units 
of selection being more able to mold selection conditions, interactors being able, to some extent, 
to change their replicators (Lamarckianism), replication entailing more variation, and ways in 
which experience in selection can direct variety generation. The last point appears to generate the 
largest deviation, perhaps even from universal Darwinism, in the sense that while the outcomes of 
variety generation still cannot be predicted, the process in not blind in that it is subject to 
intelligent choice and experience based inference.  
The analysis yields two kinds of dynamic capability. One is the ability to achieve novel 
combinations of existing knowledge by collaboration with outside partners, selecting partners at 
optimal cognitive distance, and building absorptive capacity and the ability of governing 
relational risk. Second is the ability to seek novel contexts of application as a source of novel 
insight and motives for change, along a path of differentiation and hybridization of knowledge 
and competence. For the purpose of hybridization, this includes the ability to optimally select 
partners and manage collaboration.   
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